Memorandum prepared by the Institute’s specialists and devoted to a comparative analysis of the various options for Israel’s legal response to the genocidal terrorist attack by Hamas that began on 7 October 2023 and continues to this day.
1. Why Israel should not reject the idea of international judicial process
Many actors in Israel share the following view: as long as international community currently condemns Israel’s military response to the Hamas attack and is generally biased against Israel, the State of Israel should avoid international judicial process in whatever form for the purposes of its legal response to the genocidal attack of Hamas, since it is not an advisable and adequate measure that would serve national interests.

Apart from mistrust for international justice, traditional for Israel, this view is justified by the following argument: making use of international justice will demonstrate the State of Israel’s mistrust for its own national system of justice and will lead to the recognition of its weakness. This is the reason why th e idea of international judicial process in respect of Hamas offenders should be abandoned.

This position is flawed in several respects.
1.1 Israel is already involved in international judicial process
First of all, Israel is already involved in international legal proceedings as a result of South Africa’s application against Israel before the ICJ. Israel’s decision to take part in these proceedings is by all means correct. However, it would be insuffici ent and wrong for Israel to limits its defense in this court only, since ICJ proceedings will not allow Israel to take a full fledged legal position in respect of the Hamas' genocidal attack which commenced on October 07, 2023 and continues now. This creat es a real risk of a unilateral international legal assessment of the situation in general and the actions of Hamas towards Israel/Israelis in particular.
1.2 Purely domestic trial will entail criticism of the world community
Secondly, the progress and results of the trial over the organizers and perpetrators of the genocidal attack exclusively within the framework of the Israeli domestic legal system, especially in an Israeli military court, will obviously create preconditions for criticism from the international community.

This criticism will use public statements by Israeli officials and public figures calling for the use of the death penalty, the enactment and application (including ex post facto application) of special laws for this purpose. Thus, the objectivity and impartiality of such a trial will already in advance be called into question. In addition, this criticism will be as much stronger as severe the punishments for those convicted will be.
An internationalized tribunal should not be able to utilise the death penalty because this may preclude the involvement of the United Nations and the wider international community community.
The United Nations has stated that it cannot, as a matter of policy, establish or cooperate with a tribunal that permits the death penalty as a possible punishment. The availability of the death penalty is also one of the key reasons why members states of the European Union (which is opposed to the death penalty) were reluctant to lend assistance to the IHT. For discussion as to whether the IHT was lawfully able to apply the death penalty, see: Bohlander, M., ‘Can the Iraqi Special Tribunal sentence Saddam Hussein to Death?' (2005) 3 JICJ 463.

Sarah Williams, Hybrid and Internationalized Criminal Tribunals: Jurisdictional Issues.
A doctoral thesis submitted to durham university in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree doctor of philosophy (law). March 2009. (p. 40).
One of the factors diminishing the tribunal’s credibility is lack of independence and impartiality of judges, prosecutors and the tribunal’s staff.
When the tribunal is created, or even influenced by the enemies of the defendants, the prospects for dispassionate judgment fade away. In such cases, trials threaten to become instruments of legitimized revenge, bearing the countenance of justice, at the expense of substantive fairness
Masayoshi Mukai, "Ad hoc tribunals: the failure to contribute to precedence-setting for a universal model of international justice"
Berkeley Journal of International Law Publicist, Vol. 3, (*), 2009 (p. 50).
That is why international involvement should start at least from the procedure of selection of the tribunal’s officials.
The addition of international judges and prosecutors may bolster the capacity of the local judiciary and enhance the perception that the judiciary is independent and impartial. International judges and prosecutors should be familiar with the relevant int ernational laws and standards, while local judges are familiar with the relevant local law and the territory.
Sarah Williams, Hybrid and Internationalized Criminal Tribunals: Jurisdictional Issues.
A doctoral thesis submitted to durham university in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree doctor of philosophy (law). March 2009. (p. 36). (visited on Jan. 13, 2024)
It is remarkable that before the creation of the Nuremberg tribunal UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill also opposed the idea of an international court. In fact, he insisted on summary executions of the leading Nazis. However, he changed his mind after being persuaded by the US and USSR leaders who had advocated for a judicial process that would better serve the interests of justice*. So it may well be stated that historically, the approach rejecting international involvement in a similar situation proved wrong.

*See “Nuremberg trials”. New World Encyclopedia (visited on Jan. 06, 2024)
1.3 The situation already had international dimension from the very start
Thirdly, the fact that a significant number of victims of the genocidal attack of October 07, 2023 have citizenship of various foreign states (in addition to Israeli citizenship) is another factor that determines the de facto international nature of the process of protecting their rights, as well as the presence of interests of foreign states.
2. The aim of "sending the right message" is better achieved by an international (hybrid) tribunal than by a domestic court
Punishment should not be a mere display of power of one over the other. This is exactly the kind of message criminal courts should counter. Showing brute force rather than reasons and respect for legal norms would, instead of reaffirming the legal (and moral) order, be a continuation of the conflict by other means (As Jon Elster argued, domestic trials are nearly always too harsh or too lenient*). The message sent by the punishment itself limits how much and what kind of punishment is permissible. Although enforcement of punishment inevitably comes with the use of power, it must be exercised by a legitimate authority for the right kind of reasons.

The version of expressivism we defend here takes the following form: international criminal courts achieve their aim if—and insofar as—they manage to convey the right kind of messages. The trial is a way to reaffirm legal order, establish truths, recognize the wrongs committed to the victims, and educate the public at large. It is not only a message about the crimes but also about the system of justice. It affirms its difference from the moral universe in which the crimes could occur precisely through its meticulous procedures and standards of evidence, and a humane punishment at the end. It is a way to say "no!" to war crimes and crimes against humanity. The message is one of respect for basic human rights and of nonviolent conflict resolution, and an exercise in the rule of law—all key ingredients for the (re)establishment of a well-functioning society. On this view, the fact that international criminal courts are not "of the community" whose crimes they adjudicate is an advantage over domestic trials.

* Jon Elster, Closing the Books (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
Tim Meijers and Marlies Glasius. Trials as Messages of Justice: What Should Be Expected of International Criminal Courts? (p. 437-438). (visited on Jan. 06, 2024)
3. The aim of prevention of mass atrocities is better achieved by an international (hybrid) tribunal than by a domestic court
The system of international criminal justice is still fairly new and not universal in its scope, so it might still be too soon to assess its preventative impact. At the same time, it must be noted that the possibility of being tried before an international tribunal], however remote, has the potential to deter would-be violators. See inter alia Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Responsibility to protect: timely and decisive response', (2012) UN Doc. A/66/874-S/2012/578, para 29.
4. The aim of apprehension of suspects is better achieved by an international (hybrid) tribunal than by a domestic court
Admittedly, it is easier for the violators to take refuge in other states (e.g. in Arab countries) from the local Israeli courts than from an international tribunal.
5. A unique chance to justify Israel’s course of actions
The last (but not the least) is that the unprecedented scale of atrocities characterizing the crimes begun by Hamas on October 07, 2023 and continued to the present day creates much more favorable (to a large extent unique) opportunities for Israel to uncover the truth, disclose it to the public and justify Israel’s position before the world community precisely in the format of a trial with a significant international element. Not taking advantage of such a chance would be a serious mistake.

The above considerations stipulate the necessity for the particular kind of legal response of Israel that would (a) have certain international involvement, and (b) accord fair trial guarantees to the accused and to the victims. Otherwise, the purely domestic treatment of Hamas offenders will only strengthen the growing international condemnation of Israel.

Below are some considerations regarding the establishment of the proposed ad hoc criminal tribunal.
A. The mandate of the tribunal
The mandate of the tribunal must be clearly stated, focused, and not overambitious.
It is hard to believe that a criminal tribunal can become a tool for the restoration and maintenance of international peace and security. A criminal tribunal cannot become an instrument contributing to the process of national reconciliation either. A criminal tribunal must stick to the function of determining individual criminal guilt upon allegations that a crime has been committed, that the perpetrator can be identified, investigated, arrested, prosecuted and sentenced. Whether at the domestic or the international level; criminal prosecutions serve the same purposes of deterrence, incapacitation, retribution, and fighting impunity. A criminal tribunal cannot do more than that. The mandate of any criminal tribunal must be clearly stated, focused, and not overambitious. Its objectives must be reasonably delimited to fit in the functions of a criminal tribunal. Objectives which are beyond the functions of a criminal tribunal should be abandoned and reserved to other mechanisms of accountability and truth-telling. This was not the case when the ICTY and ICTR were established.
Etienne Mutabazi. The United Nations ad hoc Tribunals' Effectiveness in Prosecuting International Crimes. (p. 367).
The mandate of the tribunal should be limited to a certain category of crimes (jurisdiction ratione materiae), to a specific territory (ratione loci), to a specific time (ratione temporis), and to a particular category of persons (ratione personae).
See Appendix II: comparative table of seven hybrid tribunals (key features — jurisdiction)*.

*Borrowed from: Sarah Williams, Hybrid and Internationalized Criminal Tribunals: Jurisdictional Issues. A doctoral thesis submitted to durham university in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree doctor of philosophy (law). March 2009. (visited on Jan. 13, 2024).
B. Key elements of the tribunal’s composition
Historically, hybrid tribunals have been set up in various ways, key elements of their composition being:
1) Trial chambers (one or several) and appellate chamber.
2) Judges: international, local or both.
3) Possible introduction of investigative judges.
4) Prosecution: international, local or both.
5) Registry: registry of domestic courts and/or registry specifically created for the hybrid tribunal.
6) Defence: no special provision or defence office established within the Registry.
7) Funding: contributions from the UN and/or other States and/or State budget.
8) Management/Oversight: various mechanisms.
9) Applicable Law: existing domestic law and/or special regulation for the tribunal.
See Appendix I: comparative table of seven hybrid tribunals (key features other than jurisdiction)*

*Regulation 64 panels in the Courts of Kosovo (Regulation 64 Panels); Special Panels for Serious Crimes in East Timor (SPSC); Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL); Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC); War Crimes Chamber in the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (WCC); Iraqi High Tribunal (IHT); Special Tribunal for Lebanon (LST).
Borrowed from: Sarah Williams, Hybrid and Internationalized Criminal Tribunals: Jurisdictional Issues. A doctoral thesis submitted to durham university in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree doctor of philosophy (law). March 2009. (visited on Jan. 13, 2024).
C. The tribunal and local authorities
The internationalized tribunal should be established with the support of the relevant local actors and should not be viewed as ‘imposed'. It is essential that the tribunal has the support, input and cooperation of local authorities
Beauvais, J., ‘Benevolent Despotism: A Critique of UN State-Building in East Timor’ (2001) 33 NYJILP 1101.
D. Some form of international scrutiny over the tribunal
It may be beneficial to place the hybrid tribunal under some form of international scrutiny, such as trial monitoring, and also subject it to international oversight, possibly in the form of a management committee or similar body.
Sarah Williams, Hybrid and Internationalized Criminal Tribunals: Jurisdictional Issues.
A doctoral thesis submitted to durham university in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree doctor of philosophy (law). March 2009. (p. 36). (visited on Jan. 13, 2024)
E. National and international components of the tribunal
Both national and foreign personnel typically staff mixed criminal tribunals. International and national judges and court personnel are meant to complement each other. That, at least, is one of the rationales usually listed for their creation. For instance, reliance on local judges and court personnel should instil in the local population a sense of ‘ownership' of the justice which is made in their name. On the other hand, international personnel are mostly there to ensure this sense of ownership does not translate into partiality. By their very presence they are meant to increase actual and perceived fairness and impartiality in proceedings.

The exact balance between the national and international components varies from case to case. Usually, international judges are the majority of the bench, but that is not always the case. Similarly, the prosecutor and/or the registrar of the court are usually foreign while the deputy is local, but there are exceptions, which, again, can only be explained by keeping in mind the particular historical and political contexts in which each of these bodies was created.
Cesare P.R. Romano. Mixed Criminal Tribunals (visited on Jan. 13, 2024).
F. Defense office
The creation of a defence office supports fairness, in particular when it combines high-level representation for the defence, administrative responsibilities including managing the list of counsel and legal aid for the defence, and substantive legal support to counsel. A defence office, responsible for providing both administrative and substantive support for the defence, has been a feature of many institutions and is usually located within the registry.

Registry staff assigned to deal with defence matters should have experience in international criminal defence.

A court’s provision of legal aid supports equality of arms and fair proceedings and has significant implications for the credibility of a court. A court or tribunal’s reputation as a fair and impartial institution may be undermined if there are indications that defendants, for lack of resources, are unable to mount an effective defence. As the IBA has emphasised, failure to adequately provide for legal aid may negatively affect perceptions about the fairness of trials, and for a court, these costs may be far greater than the actual expenses associated with operating the legal aid system. The inclusion of the right to legal aid is by itself insufficient. Hybrid tribunals and specialised chambers should include a detailed legal aid policy that clearly sets out what legal aid covers, including team composition and the costs covered per stage of proceedings.

Cases charging international crimes rely on a specialised body of law and procedure. The ability to appoint an international lawyer as part of a defence team can form an important aspect of fairness.

Mixed teams, including both domestic and international counsel, can bring relevant expertise to the defence team. Many tribunals have appointed mixed teams, and some, such as the ECCC, have required them. Lists of counsel can provide an important function in this regard, to screen counsel for admittance to practise before the tribunal on criteria including expertise in international criminal law.
See Appendix III: Support structures for defence and victims' counsel in international criminal courts and tribunals, hybrid tribunals and specialised chambers*

* Borrowed from: An International Bar Association International Criminal Court & International Criminal Law Programme report. Legal Representation, Fairness and Access to Justice in Hybrid Tribunals and Specialised Chambers. December 2018 (visited on Jan 13, 2024)
G. Mixed applicable law
Unlike international criminal tribunals, mixed criminal tribunals apply a blend of domestic and international substantive and procedural law (→ International Criminal Courts and Tribunals, Procedure). Again, the exact composition of the blend varies from case to case and meta-legal factors may explain variations. In general, the substantive and procedural law applied by mixed courts of the "internationalized domestic courts" sub-genus, such as those in Kosovo, East Timor and Bosnia-Herzegovina, is mostly on the laws of the country in which the tribunal is established revised, corrected, and/or complemented by international law rules so as to achieve internationally acceptable human rights and criminal law standards.
Cesare P.R. Romano. Mixed Criminal Tribunals (visited on Jan. 13, 2024).
H. Funding of the tribunal
The tribunal must be established on the condition that there is a secure and sufficient source of funding*

*See Linton, S., ‘Safeguarding the Independence and Impartiality of the Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers' (2006) 4 JCIJ 327, 335; and Kamhi, A., ‘Private Funding for Public Justice: The Feasibility of Donations to the Cambodian Tribunal' (2007) 48 HILJ 581. See also see Ingadottir, T., ‘Financial Challenges and their Possible Effects on Proceedings' (2006) 4 JICJ 294; Ingadottir, T., ‘The Financing of Internationalized Criminal Courts and Tribunals' in Romano, 271−290; Roper, S. and Barria, L., Designing Criminal Tribunals: Sovereignty and International Concerns in the Protection of Human Rights (Ashgate, 2006), Chapter Five.
I. A would-be ad hoc criminal tribunal is in no way bound to repeat all features of other international criminal tribunals
Researchers indicate significant problematic issues that have made substantial impact on the work of international criminal tribunals. For instance, speaking of the ICTY and the ICTR:
Even though they were established under questionable circumstances, ad hoc tribunals could have done much better had they been guided primarily by the search for justice. They were overburdened and did not acknowledge that fact. They navigated a tumultuous sea of problems which finally jeopardised their effectiveness.
Speaking of the ICC:
The notoriously vague and often outright puzzling provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court are best read as reflecting negotiated diplomatic compromises rather than some carefully constructed comprehensive view of criminal responsibility.
Markus Dirk Dubber. Comparative Criminal Law. The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law. Edited by Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann. Oxford University Press. 2008. (p. 1307)
Speaking of all international criminal tribunals:
Left without specific procedural guidelines, international criminal tribunals have been forced to generate procedural rules on the fly, based on general overviews of procedural norms, institutions and practices in various legal systems across the world prepared by the court’s staff. These norms, as well as their application in particular cases, must then be subjected to review under applicable international human rights norms, which in turn cannot be interpreted except in light of the various traditions represented by the tribunal’s judges. See e.g. the different views of the requirement of ‘equality of arms’ in the criminal process explored in Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14-/1-AR73, PP 23-25 (Appeals Chamber, ICTY, 16 February 1999).
Ibid. (p. 1307-1308).
Certainly, the model of a would-be ad hoc criminal tribunal can and should take into account the deficiencies of its "predecessors". Both its legitimacy and effectiveness will heavily depend on careful consideration of the factors which diminished other international criminal tribunals' image.
The strength of mixed criminal courts is that
they are highly customizable. There is virtually no situation in which a kind of mixed tribunal could not be imagined and created. They can be made to fit any country or suspect. They can be created ad hoc to prosecute crimes against internationally protected persons or other international crimes created by treaties, and even in fields other than international criminal law.
Cesare P.R. Romano. Mixed Criminal Tribunals (visited on Jan. 13, 2024).